Brief summary of conference held in Sapienza University on Friday 25 September 2015
http://www.gains-project.eu/conferences/geopolitics-and-internet-security/
Annual WorkShop
Maurizio Goretti (CINECA)
http://www.gains-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Goretti-Annual-Gains-Conference.pdf
Round Table (Douzet, Salamatian, Kaufmann)
|
Issue |
Douzet |
Salamatian |
Kaufmann |
|
Classification |
Ordering information for putting only “lower” stuff on Internet |
Internet is not a CI in itself. It is critical for companies and their business |
|
|
Critical Infrastructure |
It could be the case to propose some standard for provide limitation about the use of Internet for Critical Infrastructure |
||
|
Cyber-Attacks |
more responsible behaviours |
Trasparency is completely opaque:
|
Akamai is doing something important with Prolexic reports |
|
Malicious Behaviour |
It should be integrated in SW and Architecture |
Services are optimized for business: regulations are needed to establish requirements and specification in order to aiding people |
Geopolitical Risk Analysis of Euro-Asia communication
Kavé Salamatian – Universitè de Savoie (WP1 Leader)
Conceptual Network:
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Cyberspace split in Geography (embedded)
-
CyberSpace is no dependent on Geography
-
CyberSpace has a space on its own
e.g. Euro-Asia Map
Risk Analysis:
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Reliability
-
Bandwith
-
Interruption (cable cut from states in the middle)
3 paths:
|
Path |
Reliability |
Bandwidth |
Interruption |
Countries |
|
Land |
Pros: fast to solve issues |
Cons: expensive, low-band |
Cons: Mafia Risk (independent from Government) Pros: Only 1 crossing country |
Russia |
|
Maritime |
Cons: cable in the sea |
cheap (high bandwidth, 90% traffic) |
Cons: Multiple countries |
Red Sea, Indian Ocean China Sea |
|
Mixed (Land-Maritime) |
Cons: fear |
low band |
Cons: Multiple countries, different approach |
Turkey Saudi Arabia Persia India Ocean China |
Topogaphy
-
Apple, Google
-
AS Graph: no valid distance information. Anamorphe: network neighbours != geographic neighbours
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Spectral Techniques: metric = bandwidth; data-mining
CyberSpace:
-
new space
-
new movements (military strategic)
Geopolitics and the Internet
Frederick Douzet – Institut Français de Géopolitique – (Advisory board member)
No conference act.
Internet is gaining strategical part in every aspect of our life:
-
when: early ‘90s
-
how: more democracy (info sharing)
-
what: issues
-
conflict of reputation
-
cyber attack -> conflict
-
information warfare (by Governments -> Geopolitical context)
-
Consequences: strategy for transnational:
-
Cooperation for sharing information
-
Control of “cyber territory”
Representation: ideas, strategies, goals. NO action is “casual” in Internet since it has (deep) effects.
History
|
Year |
Space |
Users |
What |
Threats |
|
1994 |
new independent space (Incredible Optimism) |
Few millions company |
Open Source Self Reputation Absense of Control (in the architecture) |
hacktivist cyber crime |
|
2005 |
e-commerce |
half a billion company |
Threats / Opportunities surveillance permissions control and flag in |
Cyber Defense Digital Combat |
|
2015 |
Economy Glabalisation |
billions individuals |
smaller individuals fraud information disclosure (e.g. Snowden) |
Deep Web Dark Web |
2 Ways of Risks (new threat, global one like warming up). To counterfeating, It needs cooperation, partnership (internet is driven by private company) and it leads to contamination
|
Way |
Actor |
Means |
Goals |
Critical Infrastructure |
|
Cyber-Attack |
Private |
Survellaince Systemic approach |
reinforcing national info system not public classified information developing offensive tools |
|
|
Espionage |
Public |
Intelligence |
reinforcing national info system not public classified information developing offensive tools |
Agreement: do not attack each-other |
Geopolitical Impact of the Internet Routing Protocols
Antonio Villani (Sapienza)
http://www.gains-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mancini-Villani-gains.compressed.pdf
BGP (Border Gateway Protocol)
The Autonomous Systems (ASs) forward information about routing for reaching out the wanted IP (provided by IRR: Internet Regional Registry).
Not all ASs are equal. Security Issues:
-
NO Control Mechanisms in place (e.g. Authentication with cryptography)
-
Network Device outside the proper operators (e.g. China Telecom has router in Frankfourt)
Incident
|
Type |
seconds |
hours |
days |
|
Malfunction |
|
||
|
Hijack |
|
||
|
Leaking |
|
|
Because no cryptography in BGP, it is not possible to identify the attacker.
Control-Plane vs Data-Plane
|
Plane-Type |
Control |
Data |
|
Too |
Best-Path |
TraceRoute |
|
distance metrics |
SpellCheck |
ASs addition (75%) ASs deletion (10%) ASs difference (15%) |
Internet is the land of nobody, it resembles far-west.
The State of Internet
Christian Kaufmann (Akamai)
http://www.gains-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AKamai-20150925_gains.pdf
Akamai helps in distributing content worldwide.
Connections:
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Connection Speeds
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Bandwidth (e.g. IT 6.4 Mbps, DE 24 Mbps, SE 80 Mbps: the importance of Infrastructure!)
-
Security Aspects
Security (DDoS)
Acquisition of Prolexic (the company that is producing the only one available report providing worldwide data):
-
BotNets
-
Malware
-
Competitors
Business is the Target.
Most Damage: Gaming, Travels.
Location: targets and sources are in the same country, usually in the same city (because performance issues).
Security (Hijacking)
Destruction of Connectivity (Country not going outside) is voluntary, by Government lead (Gabon, COngo, Iraq, etc).